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ABSTRACT 
Asian economies have been and will be a growth center in the world. One of the driving 
forces for Asian economic growth seems to be their economic integration through forming 
global value chains (hereafter GVCs) especially in manufacturing sectors. This chapter aims to 
investigate the dynamic economic impacts of GVCs participation in Asian developing 
economies from the following two analytical angles. Since the creation of GVCs usually 
involves the prevailing foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) undertaken by transnational 
corporations, we first examined the impacts of FDI on the growth of GDP and exports focusing 
on ASEAN economies including latecomers and forerunners in their economic developments, 
by conducting causality tests in the vector auto-regression model. The analytical outcomes 
represented the clear causality from FDI to GDP and exports as well as the opposite causality 
from GDP and exports to FDI for a group of ASEAN economies, although individual economies 
has different causality relations. It implied that FDI has been a driving force for economic 
growth through capital accumulation and technological transfers, while FDI inflows have been 
attracted to the growing economies and markets. It should also be noted that the significant 
causality from FDI to exports might imply that the inward FDI has facilitated the GVCs 
participation in Asian economies. 
We second examined the economic impacts of GVCs participation by analyzing the 
value-added-trade data in Asian developing economies. We observed that the GVCs 
participation in manufacturing sectors has allowed the absolute domestic value added for their 
exports to contribute to their GDP growth. We also found that the development paths of 
domestic value added contributions to exports in the GVCs participating economies have 
followed “smile curve” with its turning point being 5,651 U.S. dollars in per capita GDP. It 
implied the dynamic impacts of GVCs participation, where at the initial stage of GVCs 
participation the domestic value added contributions to exports have reduced, but have 
recovered at the later stage of GVCs involvement with upgrading domestic productive 
capacities. It should also be noted that the turning points of “smile curves” differed according to 
manufacturing sectors: the sectors of food, textile, and wood products reached the turning point 
at lower per capita GDP and at higher ratio of domestic value added contributions to exports 
than those of machinery, electrical, and transport equipment.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Asian economies have been and will be a growth center in the world. For its future, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) presented the scenario called the “Asian century”, 
in which Asian share of global GDP will nearly double from 27 percent in 2010 to 51 
percent by 2050 (see ADB, 2011). One of the driving forces for Asian economic growth 
has been and will be de facto economic integration through forming global value chains 
(hereafter GVCs) especially in manufacturing sectors. In contrast with Europe, Asia 
includes countries with quite different historical, cultural, and political background and 
at different development stages. In addition, there is no top-level management to 
substitute for WTO discipline, as pointed out by Baldwin (2006). However, the 
economic integration in Asia has voluntarily developed through creating and enlarging 
GVCs by effectively utilizing different location advantages with diversified 
development stages. 
The fragmentation of production processes and the international dispersion of tasks 
and activities within them have led to the emergence of borderless production systems, 
which may be sequential chains or complex networks, and which may be global, 
regional, or span only two countries. These systems are commonly referred to as 
GVCs.
1
 GVCs are a concept taken up by different schools: economic theory, 
development studies and international business disciplines. Kimura (2006) described 
these systems in East Asia by using the terminology of “International Production and 
Distribution Network”, in such ways as active foreign direct investment, development 
of cross-border production sharing or fragmentation, sophisticated disintegration of 
production activities, and the formation of industrial agglomeration, particularly in 
machinery industries. In his paper, the “18 facts” on “International Production and 
Distribution Network” in East Asia were identified based on a number of studies using 
international trade data, micro-data of Japanese multinational-enterprises, and casual 
observations. One of the important messages in his paper is that the mechanics of such 
networks in East Asia must basically follow “fragmentation theory”, which was first 
proposed in Jones and Kierzkowski (1990 and 2005). It states that a firm’s decision on 
whether to fragment or not depends on the differences in location advantages (including 
the differences in factor prices like wages) and the levels of the “service-link costs”, 
which are costs to link remotely-located production blocks. The large differences in 
location advantages and the lower the service-link costs encourage firms to facilitate the 
fragmentation. In this context, it can be said that Asia could be the area which has the 
greatest potential for GVCs to spread all over the area with its large differences in 
                                                 
1
 This description on GVCs is based on the World Investment Report 2013 (UNCTAD, 2013). 
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location advantages within the area, so long as the issues on the service-link costs were 
cleared by policy-initiatives. 
The question then arises as to whether a developing economy, especially a 
latecomer’s economy in Asia, can really enjoy the improvement of its economic 
performance in case that the economy accepts and participates in GVCs, in other words, 
whether GVCs can accelerate the catch-up of latecomers’ economies and can lead to 
greater convergence between economies in Asia. To answer this question, there might 
be several analytical approaches in macroeconomic frameworks, and we herein focus on 
the two economic variables: foreign direct investment (FDI) and value added trade to 
address the issue on economic impacts of GVCs participation. 
The FDI may be an important avenue for an economy to gain access to GVCs and 
increase their participation. In fact, the creation of GVCs has usually involved the 
prevailing FDI undertaken by transnational corporations. For instance, UNCTAD 
(2013) identified the statistical relationship between FDI stock in countries and their 
participation in GVCs. Under this context, we first examine whether the FDI has really 
led to the growth of GDP and exports focusing on ASEAN economies including 
latecomers and forerunners in their economic developments. 
Second, we focus our analyses on examining value-added-trade patterns on Asian 
developing economies to investigate the economic impacts of their GVCs participation. 
It was difficult for the GVCs participation and its contribution to GDP enhancement to 
be analyzed directly at the country level, until the value-added-trade data have been 
developed in recent times. Now that the data have been developed, however, it has come 
to enable us to identify the GDP contribution of domestic value-added embedded in 
gross exports, and thus to quantify the country-leveled economic impacts created by the 
GVCs participation in the latecomers’ economies. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the analysis of the economic 
impacts of FDI, and Section 3 represents the value-added-trade analyses on GVCs 
participation, and Section 4 summarizes the analytical results and concludes. 
 
2. GLOVAL VALUE CHAINS AND FDI 
 
This section will examine the impacts of inward FDI on the growth of GDP and 
exports focusing on ASEAN economies including latecomers and forerunners in their 
economic developments. 
Under the endogenous growth theory developed in the 1980s, FDI has been 
considered to have permanent growth effect in the host country through technology 
transfer and spillover. Most of empirical studies have found positive effects of FDI on 
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transitional and long-run economic growth through capital accumulation and technical 
and knowledge transfers. Some of them, however, identified opposite causality from 
growth to FDI, suggesting that FDI inflows have been attracted to the growing 
economies and markets. Several studies of an individual economy have identified the 
causality between FDI and growth / exports: bidirectional causality between each pair of 
FDI, GDP and exports for China (Liu et al., 2002); unidirectional causality from FDI to 
GDP for Thailand (Kohpaiboon, 2003), for Pakistan (Ahmad et al. 2004) and for 
Mexico and Argentina (Cuadros et al., 2004); and bidirectional causality between FDI 
and GDP for Malaysia and Thailand (Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2006). The studies 
targeting a group of economies have also verified their causality: unidirectional 
causality from FDI to GDP for 24 developing countries (Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 
2000); bidirectional causality between FDI and GDP for 31 countries (Hansen and Rand, 
2006); and unidirectional causality from FDI to exports for 9 economies (Cho, 2005). It 
is Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) that investigated the most comprehensive causalities among 
all three variables of FDI, GDP and exports together, through such a sophisticated 
method as panel-data-VAR causality analysis for eight East and Southeast Asian 
economies with the stationarity of each variable being examined. They also found 
unidirectional effects of FDI on GDP directly and also indirectly through exports in the 
panel-data analysis, although the analysis of individual economies represented different 
causality relations among sample economies. 
Our study basically follows Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) in our analytical methodology 
with a focus on the impact of FDI on GDP as well as the one of FDI on exports. Our 
contributions are to extend the sample period of Hsiao and Hsiao (2006), i.e. from 1986 
to 2004 towards the period from 1984 to 2012, and to target all of ASEAN economies 
including such latecomers as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam whereas 
Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) focus rather on forerunning economies. 
 
Methodology and data 
We examine the bilateral Granger causalities between FDI and GDP and between 
FDI and exports by their time-series data of individual economies and also by their 
panel data of all sample economies. 
The sample economies are ten ASEAN economies, and the sample period is from 
1984 to 2012. The data for FDI (inward stock), GDP and exports are retrieved from 
UNCTADSTAT
2
 and expressed in real and natural logarithm terms: fdi, gdp and ext
3
. 
                                                 
2
 See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/. 
3
 All the data are deflated by GDP deflator retrieved from “Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 
2014” by ADB. 
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We then construct a vector autoregression model with p-lag, VAR(p), for fdi and 
gdp as well as for fdi and ext to test the bilateral Granger causalities as follows. 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝑉1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝑉𝑝 𝑦𝑡−𝑝 +  𝜀𝑡                                                                               
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a (2 × 1) column vector of the endogenous variables: 𝑦𝑡 =  (𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡)
′ 
or 𝑦𝑡 =  (𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑡)
′, 𝜇 is a (2 × 1) constant vector, each of 𝑉1 and 𝑉2 is a (2 × 2) 
coefficient matrix, each of 𝑦𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑡−2 is a (2 × 1) vector of the lag endogenous 
variables, and 𝜀𝑡 is a (2 × 1) vector of the random error terms in the system. The lag 
length p is selected by the minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with 
maximum lag equal to 2 under the limited number of observations. 
Before examining the causality relations, we check the stationarity of the 
time-series and panel data by employing a unit root test, and if needed, a cointegration 
test for them. Based on the data property, we select either the level series or the 
first-difference series in the VAR estimation. Regarding a unit root test, we adopt the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for the time-series data analysis of individual 
economies, and the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test for the panel data analysis of all 
sample economies. The both tests are conducted by including “intercept” and “trend and 
intercept” in the test equation. Table 1 reports the test results for the combination of fdi 
and gdp and that of fdi and ext. In Cambodia and Vietnam for the combination of fdi and 
gdp, and in the panel group for any combinations, both variables are stationary in their 
level series, and so we use their level series for the VAR estimation. In Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand for any combinations, 
a set of variables are not stationary in the level, but stationary in the first-difference, 
which are supposed to be the case of I(1), and then can be further examined by Johansen 
cointegration test. For the remaining cases, we use the first-difference series for the 
estimation. Table 2 represents the results of Johansen cointegration test with “intercept” 
and “trend and intercept” being included in the test equation. Both the trace test and the 
Maximum-eigenvalue test indicate that the level series are cointegrated in Lao PDR and 
Malaysia for the combination of fdi and gdp, and in Malaysia and Singapore for the 
combination of fdi and ext. The final selection of the level or first-difference series for 
the VAR model analysis of individual economies is described in the rightmost column 
of Table 2.   
 
Estimated Causalities and Discussion 
We now show the estimation outcomes on the bilateral Granger causalities between 
FDI and GDP and between FDI and exports by their time-series data of individual 
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economies and also by their panel data of all sample economies (see Table 3). The main 
findings are as follows. First, regarding the panel data analysis, the very clear 
bidirectional causalities are significantly identified in both the combination of FDI and 
GDP and that of FDI and exports. Second, as for the time-series data analysis of 
individual economies, each economy has different causality relations. When we focus 
on the direction from FDI to GDP, Lao PDR, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have its 
significant causality, while Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have the significant 
causality from FDI to exports. 
Such latecomers as Myanmar are, at least, turned out not to represent the causalities 
from FDI to GDP and exports. When we focus on the case of Myanmar, for instance, we 
might pick up the following possible reasons for no causalities. First, the inward FDI 
share to GDP in 2013 is still much lower in Myanmar (23.2%) than those in Thailand 
(45.4) and Vietnam (47.8).
4
 This fact might suggest that the role of FDI in Myanmar 
has been too small to give some impacts on GDP. Second, the inward FDI in Myanmar 
has highly depended on oil and gas sectors; the oil and gas sector occupies 69% whereas 
the manufacturing sector does only 5%, in the industrial composition of the inward FDI 
during the period from fiscal year of 1989 to 2010 in Myanmar.
5
 The natural resources 
exploration by foreign investors might have not so much involved domestic production 
capacity. The lower contribution of FDI in manufacturing sector in Myanmar might 
come from its lack of infrastructure development that can be typically indicated by its 
lower ranking in the Logistic Performance Index by the World Bank.
6
 
There should be, however, some reservations in the time-series data analysis of 
individual economies since the number of observations in a sample country is limited 
only to 29 of annual data. This point seems to be in line with Hsiao and Hsiao (2006), 
which argues that the time-series analysis on an individual country cannot yield a 
general rule. 
The panel data analysis of all sample economies, on the other hand, represents the 
clear causality from FDI to GDP and exports as well as the opposite causality from GDP 
and exports to FDI. It suggests that as a general tendency as a whole ASEAN, FDI has 
been a driving force for economic growth through capital accumulation and technical 
and knowledge transfers, while FDI inflows have been attracted to the growing 
economies and markets. This finding is also consistent with Hsiao and Hsiao (2006), 
which verified the significant effects of FDI on GDP directly and also indirectly through 
exports in the panel-data analysis. It should also be noted that the significant causality 
                                                 
4
 The data for FDI and GDP in 2013 are also based on UNCTADSTAT. 
5
 The data for the industrial composition of the inward FDI in Myanmar are based on DICA, 
MNPED http://www.dica.gov.mm/dicagraph%200.htm. 
6
 See http://lpisurvey.worldbank.org/international/global. 
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from FDI to exports may imply that the inward FDI has facilitated the participation of 
international production networks.  
 
3. GLOVAL VALUE CHAINS AND VALUE-ADDED-TRADE 
 
This section investigates the economic impacts of GVCs participations in Asian 
developing economies from the different angle from previous section, with a focus on 
examining their value-added-trade patterns. 
When it comes to the literature on the impact analyses of GVCs, it can be classified 
into firm- and industry-level analyses and country-level ones. Among them, there have 
been rather a plenty of literature on the firm- and industry-level analyses through some 
kinds of case studies, e.g. Nadvi et al. (2004) for Vietnamese garment and textile firms, 
Lizbeth (2011) for Brazilian industries of furniture and footwear, Lee and Gereffi (2013) 
for mobile phone, and Backer (2011) for the Apple iPod. 
The literature on the country-level analyses of GVCs impacts has, on the other hand, 
been scarce probably because such analytical instruments as value-added-trade have 
been just recently developed by several organizations. It seems to be UNCTAD (2013), 
i.e. the World Investment Report that addressed, for the first time, the country-level 
analyses of GVCs impacts in the comprehensive angles by utilizing its newly developed 
value-added-trade. UNCTAD (2013) presented the comprehensive analyses on GVCs in 
its Chapter IV, demonstrating the GVCs impacts in terms of local-value capture, job 
creation, technology dissemination as well as of upgrading and building long-term 
productive capabilities. We herein introduce three major analytical outcomes related to 
the country-level contributions of domestic value added in GVCs participation, which 
our paper tries to apply and extend to Asian developing economies. First, a statistical 
analysis correlating GVCs participation and per capita GDP growth rates showed a 
significant and positive relationship for both developed and developing economies, even 
where GVCs participation requires higher imported contents. Second, the different 
combinations of GVC participation and domestic value added creation, derived from 
value added trade patterns of 125 developing countries over 20 years, suggested that 
there might be a set of distinct “GVCs development paths” in host countries 
participating GVCs; Some economies have managed, often after participating GVCs at 
the cost of domestic value share, to regain domestic value added share, by upgrading 
within GVCs and by expanding into higher-value chains. Third, the overall GVCs 
development paths of countries is an average of the development paths of many 
industries and GVCs activities, which may have followed different levels of industrial 
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sophistication, from resource-based exports to low-, medium- and high-tech 
manufacturing exports, to exports of knowledge-based services. 
This section tries to apply aforementioned county-level analyses in UNCTAD 
(2013) to Asian developing economies for the reason that Asia can be the area which 
has the greatest potential for GVCs to spread all over the areas. In addition, we develop 
the analysis of “GVCs development paths” in such more sophisticated ways to estimate 
a non-linear, quadratic curve in the relationship between domestic value added share to 
exports and development stage (per capita GDP) so that we can obtain the regaining 
point of domestic value added share in GVCs participation process. We conduct this 
analysis of dynamic impacts of GVCs participation in Asian developing economies in 
each manufacturing sector as well as in total manufacturing. 
 
Analytical Framework by Value Added Trade 
For examining the economic impacts of GVCs participation in Asian developing 
economies, we first clarify an analytical framework with value-added-trade data. The 
data of value added trade, which have recently been developed by several international 
organizations, enable us to examine the GVCs from the country-level perspective, i.e., 
the origin of value added creation in exports and its contribution to GDP. The structure 
of value added trade is described in a simplified form in Figure 1. We suppose that raw 
materials, parts and components extracted and produced in Country A are exported to 
Country B for their processing and manufacturing by 10 units, and then re-exported to 
Country C for their final demand by 25 units. The ordinary account of gross exports is 
totaled into 35 units (10 units in Country A plus 25 units in Country B). The new 
account named “value added trade” makes it possible to divide gross exports into their 
domestic value added (e.g. 15 units in Country B) and foreign (imported) value added 
(e.g. 10 units in Country B), and thus to extract net value added exports from gross 
exports. In this case, the total exports of value added are 25 units (10 units in Country A 
plus 15 units in Country B). We also know the double account of total gross exports as 
10 units (35 units minus 25 units). According to UNCTAD (2013), at the global level, 
about 5 trillion U.S. dollars of the 19 trillion U.S. dollars in 2010 world exports are 
“double counted” in global trade figures. 
Regarding value added trade statistics, value added in trade can be estimated on the 
basis of international input-output tables that depict the economic interactions between 
countries. Due to the growing demand for analyses, several institutions such as 
UNCTAD, OECD, WTO, IDE-JETRO, have sought to compile value added trade using 
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different methodologies.
7
 UNCTAD (2013) utilized the UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database 
built by UNCTAD in collaboration with the Eora project. On the other hand, this study 
uses “OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database”, because this database is 
only the one that is open to the public since May 21, 2013.
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By using the data on value added trade, we can extract the following three key 
variables to analyze the structure of GVCs: 1) Foreign value added as a share of gross 
exports (FVX), 2) Domestic value added as a share of gross exports (DVX), and 3) 
Domestic value added in exports as a ratio of GDP (DVY). This study focuses all the 
exports on those of manufacturing sectors. We interpret FVX as a proxy of GVCs 
participation ratio, since the foreign value added incorporated into exports is a form of a 
multi-stage trade process in GVCs from the upstream perspective. UNCTAD (2013), 
however, added one more element: the exported value added incorporated in 
third-country exports from the downstream perspective as GVCs participation ratio. 
This study does not include the latter element as GVCs participation index for the 
following two reasons. First, the OECD-WTO TiVA database does not classify the 
portion of exported value added embedded in third-country exports. Second, the 
downstream element in GVCs is sometimes dominant in a group of countries exporting 
natural resources and raw materials. This study is, however, targeting the conventional 
GVCs in manufacturing sectors in Asian developing countries, and not targeting the 
GVCs in commodity-exporting group. Thus, FVX might be justified to be as a GVCs 
participation indicator in this paper. The DVY is an indicator to measure the extent to 
which domestic value added in exports contributes to the GDP of an economy. 
 
Hypothesis on Development Paths of GVCs Participation 
We next present a hypothesis on the development paths of GVCs participation, 
which illustrates the dynamic evolution process of domestic value added creation for 
GVCs participants in the context of aforementioned value-added-trade framework (see 
Figure 2).
9
 At the early stage before GVCs participation, an economy stays at high 
DVX and low DVY, in which most of exports are domestically produced and their 
contribution to GDP is small. When an economy participate in GVCs, it moves to the 
stage with low DVX and high DVY, since an economy’s production for its exports have 
to depend highly on imports of parts, components and machineries from foreign 
countries, whereas its absolute production value for exports contributes a lot to its rising 
GDP. At the matured stage of GVCs involvement, an economy can enjoy a combination 
                                                 
7
 There has also been a trial to unify the methodologies to estimate value added trade. See, for 
instance, Koopman et al. (2012). 
8
 It can be downloaded through http://stats.oecd.org/. 
9 The essence of the hypothesis comes from the description in UNCTAD (2013). 
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of high DVX and high DVY; its production for exports continues to contribute to GDP 
growth, and at the same time, the dependence on imports for its exports declines due to 
the expansion of domestic productive capacities. 
The process of enhancing local productive capacities may involve a number of 
mechanisms: the key exporting industries may provide opportunities for local industries 
to participate in GVCs, which will leads to generating additional value added through 
local outsourcing within and across industries; and/or the key exporting industries 
themselves may attain their industrial upgrading through technology dissemination and 
skill building, which will improve their productivity and will facilitate their entries and 
expansions towards higher valued sectors. It should be noted that these development 
paths are not always realized automatically and its achievements differ according to the 
characteristic of the GVCs and the involved countries. Government policies also matter 
to optimize the economic contributions of the GVCs participation and involvement. 
Based on the hypothesis on the development paths, we extract empirical evidence 
from the following perspectives. The first one is the relationship between GVCs 
participation and its GDP contribution. It can be examined by estimating a 
linear-positive correlation between FVX and DVY. The second one is the association 
between the contribution of domestic value added to exports and development stages. It 
can be addressed by estimating a correlation between DVX and per capita GDP 
(hereafter PCY). As the hypothesis shows, the DVX will follow not one-off moves but 
such a sequence of moves as high, low and high ones along development process, 
thereby creating “smile curve”.10 The empirical evidence will be presented in the next 
sub-section. 
 
Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Impacts of GVCs Participation 
Before presenting the empirical evidence based on the aforementioned perspectives, 
we clarify the data available for sample countries and periods. Regarding the data for 
value added trade of “Gross exports”, “Foreign value added content of gross exports” 
and “Domestic value added embodied in gross exports”, the OECD-WTO TiVA 
database that we use confines sample countries to 24 developing countries and sample 
years to 5 years of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2009. We adopt 8 Asian developing 
countries for: Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. As for sample years, we exclude the year of 2009 that was seriously 
influenced by the world Lehman Shock. In all variables, we extract manufacturing 
                                                 
10
 The “smile curve” originated from Baldwin (2012) in the different context of firm-level analysis, 
which described the connection between manufacturing stages and stage’s share of product’s total 
value added. 
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sectors from 15 to 37 in the code of the International Standard Industrial Classification 
of All Economic Activities Rev.3.1. The data of GDP and per capita GDP are retrieved 
from “World Economic Outlook Database October 2013” by International Monetary 
Funds in terms of “Gross domestic product, current prices, U.S. dollars” and “Gross 
domestic product per capita, current prices, U.S. dollars”, and selected by the same 
countries and years as the data of value added trade. In sum, we construct panel data 
with 8 Asian countries for 4 years of 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008, to conduct the 
following panel estimation. 
Regarding the first perspective, namely, the relationship between GVCs 
participation (FVX) and its GDP contribution (DVY), Table 4 reported the estimation 
outcomes (Figure 3 described simply their relationship). In panel estimation, we usually 
assume a country-specific effect, and adopt either fixed-effect model or random-effect 
one according to its correlation with the explanatory variable (the former in case of the 
existence of the correlation and the latter in its absence). Based on the statistics of the 
Wu-Hausman test (see Hausman, 1978), which is used to help choose between these 
two models, we adopt random-effect model. Under this model, we could get an 
expected outcome, i.e., a positive correlation at 99 percent significant level between 
DVY and FVX. Thus, it suggested that an economy’s participation in GVCs allows an 
absolute domestic value added for exports to contribute to GDP growth, and this 
outcome is perfectly consistent with those of UNCTAD (2013). 
As for the second perspective, namely, the association between the contribution of 
domestic value added to exports (DVX) and development stages (PCY), Table 5 
represented the estimation outcomes (Figure 4 described their relationship). We also 
adopt random-effect model following the Wu-Hausman test results. We could obtain 
also expected results: the coefficient of PCY is significantly negative; the one of a 
square of PCY is discernibly positive; and the turning points in PCY are 5,651 U.S. 
dollars in the estimation. Thus, the U-shape, smile curves were identified in the 
development path of domestic value added contribution to exports along with the 
development stages. In particular, it should be noted that the estimation outcome was 
not valid in linear regression, and only valid in quadratic equation with all coefficients 
being significant at 99 percent level, and that the turning point of per capita GDP, 5,651 
U.S. dollars is highly reasonable level. It might be said that the estimated “smile curves” 
consistently quantify the “GVCs development paths” described in UNCTAD (2013), 
and that following the curves shown in Figure 4, Malaysia, Thailand and China appear 
to be passing their turning point, thereby entering the stage of regaining domestic value 
added share in GVCs participation process with the expansion of domestic productive 
capacities through local outsourcing and industrial upgrading. 
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As UNCTAD (2013) suggested, the overall GVCs development paths of countries 
is nothing more than an average of the different GVCs development paths in a variety of 
industries, and so the smile curves estimated above may differ in their shapes and 
turning points according to manufacturing sectors. We therefore estimate the DVX – 
PCY relationships in each of eight manufacturing sub-sector categories: “Food products, 
beverages and tobacco”, “Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear”, “Wood, paper, 
paper products, printing and publishing”, “Chemicals and non-metallic mineral 
products”, “Basic metals and fabricated metal products”, “Machinery and equipment”, 
“Electrical and optical equipment” and “Transport equipment”. As Table 6 reported, all 
the coefficients of PCY are significantly negative and those of a square of PCY are 
discernibly positive, and thus the smile curves were identified in the development paths 
of all manufacturing categories. 
The most noteworthy finding is that the turning points of smile curves differ a lot 
and even represent a clear contrast according to manufacturing sectors as the sectoral 
“smile curve” in Figure 5 illustrated. The sectors of food, wood and textile products 
reach the turning point at lower per capita GDP ranging from 5,100 to 5,400 U.S. 
dollars and at higher ratio of domestic value added contributions to gross exports from 
57% to 71%. On the contrary, the sectors of machinery, electrical, and transport 
equipment face the turning point at higher per capita GDP ranging from 5,800 to 6,400 
U.S. dollars and at lower ratio of domestic value added contributions to gross exports 
from 37% to 49%. It suggests that the sectors of food, wood and textile products, which 
require relatively less sophisticated technologies and a smaller number of supply chains, 
can attain the higher degree of localization of production capacity necessary for exports 
at the earlier time; on the other hand, the sectors of machinery, electrical, and transport 
equipment, which involve relatively more sophisticated technologies and a larger 
number of supply chains, take a longer time to raise up the local production capacity, 
since such sectors need to acquire a lot of technology transfer along with long 
supply-chains and also to materialize transferred technology for their local production. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter investigated the dynamic economic impacts of GVCs participation in 
Asian developing economies. The creation of GVCs usually involves the prevailing FDI 
undertaken by transnational corporations, and for Asian developing economies the 
inward FDI could be an important avenue to gain access to GVCs. Under this context, 
we first examined whether the FDI has really led to the growth of GDP and exports 
focusing on ASEAN economies including latecomers and forerunners in their economic 
13 
 
developments, by conducting causality tests in the vector auto-regression model. The 
analytical outcomes represented the clear causality from FDI to GDP and exports as 
well as the opposite causality from GDP and exports to FDI for a group of ASEAN 
economies, although individual economies has different causality relations. It implied 
that FDI has been a driving force for economic growth through capital accumulation 
and technological transfers, while FDI inflows have been attracted to the growing 
economies and markets. It should also be noted that the significant causality from FDI 
to exports might imply that the inward FDI has facilitated the GVCs participation in 
Asian economies. 
We second examined the economic impacts of GVCs participation by analyzing the 
value-added-trade data in Asian developing economies. We observed that the GVCs 
participation in manufacturing sectors has allowed the absolute domestic value added 
for their exports to contribute to their GDP growth. We also found that the development 
paths of domestic value added contributions to exports in the GVCs participating 
economies have followed “smile curve” with its turning point being 5,651 U.S. dollars 
in per capita GDP. It implied the dynamic impacts of GVCs participation, where at the 
initial stage of GVCs participation the domestic value added contributions to exports 
have reduced, but have recovered at the later stage of GVCs involvement with 
upgrading domestic productive capacities. It should also be noted that the turning points 
of “smile curves” differed according to manufacturing sectors: the sectors of food, 
textile, and wood products reached the turning point at lower per capita GDP and at 
higher ratio of domestic value added contributions to exports than those of machinery, 
electrical, and transport equipment. 
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Table 1 Results of ADF and LLC Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: (1) The lag length in the test equation follows automatic selection by Schwarz Info Criterion. (2) 
***, **, * denote rejection of null hypothesis of “series has a unit root” at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance, respectively.  
 
Combination of fdi  and gdp
ADF Unit Root Test
intercept trend & intercept intercept trend & intercept
fdi -3.71** -2.09 -2.94* -3.35*
gdp -0.34 -7.07*** -9.70*** -9.24***
fdi -8.05*** -4.21** - -
gdp -7.54*** -1.81 - -
fdi -2.07 -2.04 -3.66** -3.59**
gdp -2.99** -1.33 -5.38*** -5.27***
fdi -2.36 -2.19 -2.93* -3.04
gdp -1.69 -1.93 -5.13*** -5.88***
fdi -1.05 -1.64 -5.27*** -5.20***
gdp -0.61 -1.88 -4.88*** -4.79***
fdi -2.50 -2.28 -3.71** -4.02**
gdp -2.79* 0.61 -3.28** -4.98***
fdi 0.10 -2.01 -4.40*** -4.53***
gdp -1.26 -0.68 -4.31*** -4.59***
fdi -0.63 -3.92** -5.86*** -5.91***
gdp -0.59 -2.30 -3.84*** -3.83**
fdi -1.32 -2.36 -5.70*** -5.84***
gdp -0.86 -2.27 -3.98*** -3.91**
fdi -3.81*** -6.74*** - -
gdp -3.61** -7.41*** - -
LLC Unit Root Test
intercept trend & intercept intercept trend & intercept
fdi -1.70** -1.21 - -
gdp -2.01** -0.21 - -
Combination of fdi  and ext
ADF Unit Root Test
intercept trend & intercept intercept trend & intercept
fdi -3.71** -2.09 -2.94* -3.35*
ext -1.94 -3.72* -4.94*** -5.11***
fdi -8.05*** -4.21** -11.10*** -10.41***
ext -2.30 -1.76 -12.77*** -12.96***
fdi -2.07 -2.04 -3.66** -3.59**
ext -2.60 -2.37 -4.78*** -4.87***
fdi -2.36 -2.19 -2.93* -3.04
ext -1.33 -2.21 -6.02*** -6.13***
fdi -1.05 -1.64 -5.27*** -5.20***
ext -1.75 -1.57 -4.17*** -4.42***
fdi -2.50 -2.28 -3.71** -4.02**
ext -0.85 -1.57 -4.61*** -4.49***
fdi 0.10 -2.01 -4.40*** -4.53***
ext -0.51 -0.18 -4.15*** -5.61***
fdi -0.63 -3.92** -5.86*** -5.91***
ext -0.35 -2.26 -5.27*** -5.19***
fdi -1.32 -2.36 -5.70*** -5.84***
ext -1.59 -1.90 -4.10*** -4.16**
fdi -3.81*** -6.74*** -13.99*** -14.10***
ext -1.41 -2.06 -4.55*** -4.47***
LLC Unit Root Test
intercept trend & intercept intercept trend & intercept
fdi -1.70** -1.21 - -
ext -2.64*** 1.36 - -
level first difference
For estimation
first difference
level
I (1)
I (1)
level
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
I (1)
I (1)
level
level first difference
For estimation
I (1)
I (1)
I (1)Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Panel data
level first difference
level
For estimation
I (1)
I (1)
I (1)
first difference
I (1)
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
first difference
first difference
I (1)
I (1)
I (1)
first difference
For estimation
Panel data level
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
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Table 2 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote rejection of null hypothesis of “no cointegrating equations” at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level of significance, respectively. 
  
Combination of fdi  and gdp
trace max-eigen trace max-eigen
Combination of fdi  and ext
trace max-eigen trace max-eigen
- - - -
1.70 1.67 13.93 12.37
7.31 6.65 26.3** 19.80**
8.88
15.05* 10.17 16.60 11.31
19.50** 16.16** 21.89 16.96
5.94
- - - -
- - - -
2.01 1.95 11.01 9.09
5.56 5.15 20.37 15.85
26.80*** 21.33*** 27.67** 21.53**
17.13** 15.74** 26.73** 19.52**
- - - -
-
Singapore level
Thailand first difference
Vietnam first difference
10.31 8.01 14.67 8.77
Malaysia level
Myanmar first difference
Philippines first difference
7.13 6.43 10.60 7.87
Cambodia first difference
Indonesia first difference
Lao PDR first difference
- - - -
intercept trend & intercept
For estimation
Brunei first difference
10.83 7.22 13.02
Thailand first difference
Vietnam level
6.26 4.16 8.22
Myanmar first difference
Philippines first difference
Singapore first difference
16.83** 10.21 18.05 11.35
Indonesia first difference
Lao PDR level
Malaysia level
9.10 6.15 16.30 12.21
intercept trend & intercept
For estimation
Brunei first difference
Cambodia level- - -
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Table 3 Results of Granger Causality Test 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote rejection of null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. 
  
Combination of fdi  and gdp
Lags Null Hypothesis F-Statistic
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(GDP) 0.52
 D(GDP) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.03
 FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 0.46
 GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 5.61**
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(GDP) 0.03
 D(GDP) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.00
 FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 3.79**
 GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 0.10
 FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 0.12
 GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 7.76**
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(GDP) 0.03
 D(GDP) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.31
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(GDP) 0.00
 D(GDP) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.94
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(GDP) 6.76***
 D(GDP) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.31
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(GDP) 21.84***
 D(GDP) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 3.09*
 FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 12.80***
 GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 16.76***
 FDI does not Granger Cause GDP 20.85***
 GDP does not Granger Cause FDI 9.44***
Combination of fdi  and ext
Lags Null Hypothesis F-Statistic
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 0.95
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.41
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 0.80
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 6.19**
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 0.38
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.69
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 2.06
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.00
 FDI does not Granger Cause EXT 0.00
 EXT does not Granger Cause FDI 6.21**
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 1.13
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 3.76*
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 11.55***
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 3.26*
 FDI does not Granger Cause EXT 3.55**
 EXT does not Granger Cause FDI 0.02
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 8.52***
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.71
 D(FDI) does not Granger Cause D(EXT) 0.01
 D(EXT) does not Granger Cause D(FDI) 0.16
 FDI does not Granger Cause EXT 5.58***
 EXT does not Granger Cause FDI 8.27***
Panel data
Panel data
2
2
Vietnam 1
Thailand 1
Singapore 2
Philippines 2
Myanmar 1
Malaysia 1
Lao PDR 1
Indonesia 1
Cambodia 2
Brunei 1
Vietnam 2
Thailand 1
Singapore 2
Philippines 1
Myanmar 1
Malaysia 1
Lao PDR 2
Indonesia 1
Cambodia 2
Brunei 1
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Figure 2 Development Paths of GVCs Participation  
 
Source: Author’s description 
  
Figure 1 Structure of Value Added Trade 
 
 Source: Author’s description based on UNCTAD (2013) 
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Table 4 Estimation on GDP Contribution with GVCs Participation 
 
 
Figure 3 Linkage between GVCs Participation and GDP Contribution 
 
 
  
Variales DVY
Const. 3.379
(0.665)
FVX 0.379 
***
(4.011)
Adj R
**2 0.330
Sample size 32
   <the Wu-Hausman Test> 
Chi-Sq. Statistic 0.584
Chi-Sq. d.f. 1
Prob. 0.444
Estimation Type Random
Note:
1) The T-value is shown in parenthese. 
2) One, two, or three asterisks indicate that a coefficient estimate is significantly
    different from zero at 10, 5, or 1% percent level, respectively.
Source: OECD TiVA Data May 2013
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Table 5 Estimation on Development Paths of GVCs Participation 
 
 
Figure 4 Development Paths of GVCs Participation (Hypothesis of Smile Curve) 
 
 
Variales
Const. 65.385 
***
72.581 
***
(12.274) (12.346)
PCY -2.062*10
-3
-8.815*10
-3 ***
(-1.687) (-3.597)
PCY
2
7.800*10
-7 ***
(3.039)
Turning Point 5,651
Adj R
**2 0.058 0.265
Sample size 32 32
   <the Wu-Hausman Test> 
Chi-Sq. Statistic 0.042 1.919
Chi-Sq. d.f. 1 2
Prob. 0.836 0.383
Estimation Type Random Random
Note:
1) The T-value is shown in parenthese. 
2) One, two, or three asterisks indicate that a coefficient estimate is significantly
    different from zero at 10, 5, or 1% percent level, respectively.
Source: OECD TiVA Data May 2013
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Table 6 Estimation on Development Paths of GVCs Participation by Sectors 
 
  
Variales
Food products,
beverages and
tobacco
Textiles, textile
products, leather and
footwear
Wood, paper, paper
products, printing and
publishing
Chemicals and non-
metallic mineral
products
Const. 88.256 
*** 69.926 *** 82.066 *** 72.510 ***
(23.555) (10.214) (18.729) (13.731)
PCY -6.661*10
-3 ***
-4.830*10
-3 **
-7.894*10
-3 ***
-8.022*10
-3 ***
(-3.417) (-2.399) (-3.281) (-3.111)
PCY
2
6.350*10
-7 ***
4.470*10
-7 **
7.640*10
-7 ***
7.940*10
-7 ***
(3.022) (2.162) (2.911) (2.889)
Turning Point 5,245 5,403 5,166 5,052
Average DVX 80.3 64.1 72.7 63.1
Adj R
**2 0.203 0.103 0.209 0.185
Sample size 32 32 32 32
Estimation Type Random Random Random Random
Variales
Basic metals and
fabricated metal
products
Machinery and
equipment, nec
Electrical and optical
equipment
Transport equipment
Const. 70.362 
*** 65.220 *** 65.469 *** 69.928 ***
(10.097) (10.819) (8.534) (10.608)
PCY -8.410*10
-3 ***
-5.941*10
-3 **
-9.767*10
-3 ***
-7.291*10
-3 ***
(-3.488) (-2.487) (-3.456) (-2.803)
PCY
2
6.890*10
-7 ***
4.660*10
-7 *
8.260*10
-7 ***
6.210*10
-7 **
(2.763) (1.870) (2.815) (2.290)
Turning Point 6,103 6,374 5,912 5,870
Average DVX 59.6 57.4 53.1 60.7
Adj R
**2 0.253 0.141 0.261 0.170
Sample size 32 32 32 32
Estimation Type Random Random Random Random
Note:
1) The T-value is shown in parenthese. 
2) One, two, or three asterisks indicate that a coefficient estimate is significantly
    different from zero at 10, 5, or 1% percent level, respectively.
Source: OECD TiVA Data May 2013
DVX Asia
DVX Asia
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Figure 5 Smile Curve by Manufacturing Sectors 
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